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PROLOGUE 
While this Note was undergoing the last stages of revision before 
publication, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals published its decision in the 
appeal by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to the Southern 
District of New York’s judgment in Sokolow v. PLO.1  The Second Circuit 
disagreed with the district court and vacated the judgment against the PLO.2  
Specifically, the court held that the district court did not have personal 
jurisdiction over the defendants regarding the claims brought against them.3  
This Note will briefly cover the recent decision, but the remainder of the 
Note will remain as originally written as other cases are still pending an 
appeal which may reintroduce this issue, or if this issue is raised to the 
Supreme Court. 
In the opinion, the court first addressed the three requirements of 
exercising personal jurisdiction.4  First, service of process on the defendant 
by the plaintiff must have been proper.5  Second, such service of process 
must fulfill a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction to be effective.6  Lastly, 
such “exercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with constitutional Due 
Process principles.”7  As the defendants did not dispute the first two 
requirements, the court only analyzed whether the third prong was met; 
whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendants was consistent with 
the Constitution.8 
Before analyzing due process under the Constitution, the court addressed 
three threshold issues, some of which were addressed in this Note.  First, the 
court noted that the defendants had not waived or forfeited their objection to 
the district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction because they consistently 
raised the issue.9  Second, the PLO and Palestinian Authority (PA) did have 
due process rights because they were a non-sovereign entity and neither had 
been recognized as a sovereign state by the United States, whose 
determination is conclusive.10  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals took an 
alternate viewpoint on this issue than what is described in this Note, which 
advocated that the court could deem the PA and PLO not to have due process 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Waldman v. PLO, 835 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 2 Id. at 322. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. at 327. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. (quoting Licci ex rel Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 59–60 (2d 
Cir. 2012)). 
 8 Id. at 328. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. at 329. 
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rights.  Third, the court recognized that a due process analysis was 
substantially the same under both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution, with the principal difference being that under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, a court can only consider all of the defendant’s contacts with 
the forum state, while under the Fifth Amendment, the court can consider all 
of the defendant’s contacts in the United States.11  Here, the court again 
analyzed this issue differently from this Note by judging the test to be 
roughly the same under both legal views. 
Rather than review the court’s entire analysis of the reasonableness of 
exercising personal jurisdiction and the minimum contacts of the PA and 
PLO, this section will briefly cover the parts of the Second Circuit’s opinion 
that related to this Note.  Mainly, the court held that the Daimler decision 
applied not just to corporations, but to all “entities,” and therefore, it applied 
to the defendants in this case.12  The court also rejected the idea that the 
defendants’ contacts throughout the United States were enough to subject it 
to general jurisdiction because “there is no doubt that the ‘far larger 
quantum’ of the defendants’ activities too place in Palestine.”13  In regards to 
the “exceptional cases” referenced in Daimler, the Second Circuit rejected 
that this was such a case.14  The court stated that such exceptional cases were 
ones like in Perkins v. Benguet, where the defendants were temporarily 
located in the United States due to World War II.15  Nor were the attacks in 
this case, in the court’s opinion, sufficiently aimed at the United States to 
allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction.16 
Of course, this decision by the Second Circuit eliminates the split 
between the courts that forms the centerpiece of this Note.  The judgments of 
the District Court of D.C. are still awaiting appeal, though.  If the D.C. 
Circuit decides the issue differently from the Second Circuit, then this Note 
will once again be an important discussion on the issues at play.  Even so, the 
author hopes that this Note will provide useful background information 
regarding the exercise of jurisdiction over defendants in terrorism litigation 
and other jurisdictional issues. 
  
                                                                                                                   
 11 Id. at 330 (citing Chew v. Dietrich, 143 F.3d 24, 28 n.4 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
 12 Id. at 332. 
 13 Id. at 333. 
 14 Id. at 335. 
 15 Id.  
 16 Id. at 338. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Terrorism is an inescapable aspect of the modern global political 
landscape.  It can be as “small” as a shooting of Jewish worshippers 
attempting to visit a holy tomb or as “big” as a wave of suicide bombings 
across an entire country.  The United States has felt the effects at home: from 
shootings by extremists linked to a new threat like the Islamic State, to a 
layered, orchestrated plot to strike at the symbols of our nation in New York 
and Washington.  Some of these attacks are carried out by lone wolves, 
independent of support or funding.  Others are part of consolidated strategies 
pushing for political change or disruption.  
Plaintiffs in New York and Washington, D.C. have taken it upon 
themselves to pursue the perpetrators and supporters of these attacks.17  For 
decades, litigation has sought some measure of remedy for the victims and 
their families.  In particular, the PA and PLO have been named as defendants 
in American courts, called to answer allegations that their organizations 
supported and controlled such attacks.  
In New York, plaintiffs have won major victories with record punitive 
damage awards.18  In Washington, D.C., though, plaintiffs have found their 
cases dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.19  The United States 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman20 led the courts 
in Washington to conclude that they could not exercise general personal 
jurisdiction over such foreign defendants because they were not “essentially 
at home” in the forum.  In New York, the court found it could exercise 
personal jurisdiction in spite of the Daimler decision, holding that there was 
jurisdiction under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1991 (ATA) and that this 
jurisdiction fell under the Court’s range of possible exceptional cases in 
Daimler.  Currently, all these decisions are on appeal at their respective 
circuit courts.  
This Note will examine the history of personal jurisdiction in the United 
States and its effects on this litigation.  Further, it will review the evolution 
of anti-terrorism litigation over the last few decades, looking at legislation 
and its effects on the litigation of terrorism.  Next, this Note will analyze the 
cases pending in the Southern District of New York and the District Court of 
                                                                                                                   
 17 See Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 19 (D.D.C. 2015); Safra v. Palestinian 
Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 37 (D.D.C. 2015); Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 
3d 237 (D.D.C. 2015); Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation (Sokolow II), No. 04 Civ. 597, 2014 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168114 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2014). 
 18 Benjamin Weiser, Palestinian Groups Are Found Liable at Manhattan Terror Trial, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/24/nyregion/damages-awarded-in-te 
rror-case-against-palestinian-groups.html?_r=0.  
 19 Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 19; Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 37; Klieman, 82 F. Supp. at 237. 
 20 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
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D.C.  Finally, this Note will consider the future of this litigation and the 
possible avenues the circuit courts may follow in deciding these cases.  In 
particular, the courts will have to examine if Due Process rights even apply 
to the PA and PLO.  The courts will also have to determine if the Daimler 
and Fourteenth Amendment analysis used by the D.C. courts was appropriate 
or if a Fifth Amendment analysis is required.  Lastly, the courts will likely 
look at the Supreme Court’s recognition of exceptional cases under Daimler 
and whether the PA and PLO fit into that category of defendants. 
II.  GENERAL JURISDICTION, DAIMLER, AND THE END OF SIGNIFICANT 
CONTACTS 
A.  A History of Personal Jurisdiction 
The Daimler decision is the latest in the long string of cases read by first 
year law students.  Since the Court’s ruling in Pennoyer v. Neff, the Court 
has produced numerous opinions attempting to narrow down exactly when a 
court has jurisdiction over a defendant.  In Pennoyer, the Court made the 
landmark decision that “[t]he authority of every tribunal is necessarily 
restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established.”21  
This established the general limit under the Fourteenth Amendment on the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction extraterritorially, though that strict approach 
has loosened over time with the advances in “technology of transportation 
and communication, and the tremendous growth of interstate business 
activity.”22 
The first major opinion that expanded a State’s ability to exercise 
personal jurisdiction extraterritorially came in International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington.23  There, the Court held Due Process requires the defendant to 
have “certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance 
of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.”24  As the Court noted later, “the relationship among the defendant, 
the forum, and the litigation, rather than the mutually exclusive sovereignty 
of the States on which the rules of Pennoyer rest, became the central concern 
of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction.”25  The importance of International 
Shoe is that the lawsuit must arise from the activities of the defendant in the 
forum.26  Today, this is known as specific jurisdiction.27  Though the Court 
                                                                                                                   
 21 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878). 
 22 Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 617 (1990). 
 23 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 24 Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
 25 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).  
 26 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. 
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avoided giving a detailed rule on what kind of acts or connections allow the 
exercise of specific jurisdiction, it recognized that “the commission of some 
single or occasional acts of the corporate agent in a state” could potentially 
be enough.28  In his concurrence, Justice Stevens commented that what is 
needed is fair notice, which “includes fair warning that a particular activity 
may subject a person to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.”29  The Due 
Process Clause requires this fair notice in order to “[give] a degree of 
predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure 
their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that 
conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.”30 
International Shoe also distinguished between the exercise of jurisdiction 
over a defendant in a lawsuit originating from their actions in the forum state 
and the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign defendant when their 
“operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature” that 
lawsuits arising from actions or dealings outside the state are justified.31  
Later, the Court would hold that a state could only exercise this “general 
jurisdiction” over foreign defendants “when their affiliations with the State 
[were] so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home 
in the forum State.”32  The seminal case on “general jurisdiction 
appropriately exercised over a foreign corporation that has not consented to 
suit in the forum” is Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.33  In that case, 
the defendant corporation was incorporated in the Philippines but left the 
country during the Japanese occupation of the islands in World War II.34  
The company’s president moved to Ohio where he maintained an office and 
from where he oversaw the business.35  The plaintiff sued the company over 
a claim that did not arise in Ohio and was not related to the defendant’s 
actions or connections in that state.36  The Court held that due process would 
                                                                                                                   
 27 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011). 
 28 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318.  
 29 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring).  See also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 
(1984) (holding that defendant’s intentional actions aimed at the forum State of California 
were enough that he might reasonably have expected to be sued there).  But see J. McIntyre 
Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (rejecting that a defendant’s predicting that its 
goods would reach the forum was enough to exercise specific jurisdiction and requiring 
“purposeful availment”). 
 30 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).  See also Burger 
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (holding that the fair notice requirement 
is satisfied where defendants have “purposefully directed” the activities at the forum State). 
 31 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318. 
 32 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851. 
 33 Id. at 2856. 
 34 Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447 (1952). 
 35 Id. at 447–48.  
 36 Id. at 447.  
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2017 2:57 PM 
106  GA. J. INT’L & COMP.  L. [Vol. 45:99 
not be violated by the exercise of jurisdiction over the corporate defendant37 
because, it later noted, “Ohio was the corporation’s principal, if temporary, 
place of business.”38 
The next case to clarify the exercise of general jurisdiction was 
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall.39  The plaintiffs in the 
case were the survivors and representatives of four American citizens killed 
in a helicopter crash in Peru.40  The defendants had contacts with Texas, but 
they were limited to one trip by the CEO to Houston, the purchasing of 
helicopters and equipment from a company in Texas, and sending personnel 
to Texas for training.41  The Court refused to classify these connections as 
the type of “continuous and systematic general business contacts” necessary 
for the exercise of general jurisdiction.42  
In 2011, the Court again addressed the restrictions on general jurisdiction 
in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, a case arising from the 
deaths of two North Carolina residents in a bus accident near Paris.43  The 
defendants were Goodyear USA, an Ohio corporation that operated tire 
plants in North Carolina, as well as three foreign subsidiaries.44  Though 
Goodyear USA did not contest to jurisdiction, the foreign subsidiaries did so 
on the grounds that the small percentage of tires they produced that entered 
the stream of commerce and were distributed in North Carolina were not 
enough to warrant the exercise of general jurisdiction.45  The Court held that 
such contacts were inadequate and “[did] not establish the ‘continuous and 
systematic’ affiliation necessary to empower the North Carolina courts to 
entertain claims unrelated to the foreign corporation’s contacts with the 
State.”46  The Court specifically noted that the foreign defendants could not 
be described “in [any] sense [as] at home in North Carolina.”47 
                                                                                                                   
 37 Id. at 448. 
 38 Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 n.11 (1984). 
 39 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
 40 Id. at 410.  
 41 Id. at 416. 
 42 Id.  
 43 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850 (2011). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 2850–51.  
 46 Id. at 2851.  See also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987) 
(holding that mere awareness that the goods defendant has manufactured, sold, and delivered 
outside the country would reach the forum state through the stream of commerce did not 
constitute minimum contacts such as to justify the exercise of jurisdiction). 
 47 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857. 
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B.  Daimler and its Effect 
Most recently, the Supreme Court unanimously clarified its position on 
the exercise of general jurisdiction over foreign corporate defendants in 
Daimler AG v. Bauman.48  In a holding that has had far-reaching 
consequences, the Court reiterated the rule from Goodyear that a court could 
only assert general jurisdiction over a foreign defendant “when the 
corporation’s affiliations with the State in which suit is brought are so 
constant and pervasive ‘as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum 
State.’ ”49  The plaintiffs alleged that a subsidiary of Daimler AG, Mercedes-
Benz Argentina (MB Argentina), worked with the Argentinian government 
to “kidnap, detain, torture, and kill” their own employees during a period of 
Argentinian history known as the “Dirty War.”50  The plaintiffs claimed that 
jurisdiction was merited through the California contacts of another subsidiary 
of Daimler, Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (MBUSA).51  MBUSA is a Delaware 
corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey that distributes 
vehicles for sale to independent dealerships across the country, including in 
California.52  
The Court held that Daimler was not essentially at home in California and 
therefore was not subject to general jurisdiction there,53 reasoning that 
subjecting the defendant to general jurisdiction in California based on its 
limited contacts there would subject it to general jurisdiction in every State, 
thus making it difficult for the corporation “to structure [its] primary conduct 
with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not 
render [it] liable to suit.”54  
However, the Court did not say that the place of incorporation and 
principal place of business were the only places a defendant could be subject 
to general jurisdiction, only that those were “paradigm all-purpose forums.”55  
This leaves open the possibility of an exceptional case where a corporation’s 
connections with a forum state other than “its formal place of incorporation 
or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to 
render the corporation at home in that State.”56  However, the Court 
dismissed the plaintiff’s proposal that a corporation be subject to general 
                                                                                                                   
 48 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746.  
 49 Id. at 751 (quoting Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851) (alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
 50 Id.  
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 762.  
 54 Id. at 761–62 (quoting Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 472). 
 55 Id. at 760 (referencing Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853). 
 56 Id. at 761 n.19.  
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jurisdiction in any state where the corporation “engages in a substantial, 
continuous, and systematic course of business.”57 
C.  What Exactly is “At Home”? 
What, exactly, does it mean to be “at home”?  In Daimler, the Court 
reiterated the paradigmatic forums for general jurisdiction are the 
individual’s domicile and the corporation’s place of incorporation or 
principal place of business.58  The latter is derived from International Shoe, 
which referred to all-purpose corporate jurisdiction in “instances in which 
the continuous corporate operations within a state [are] so substantial and of 
such a nature as to justify suit . . . on causes of action arising from dealings 
entirely distinct from those activities.”59  A corporation’s principal place of 
business is “where a corporation’s officers direct, control, and coordinate the 
corporation’s activities.”60  The Court avoided applying a “more general 
business activities test” where lower courts have looked at the “total amount 
of business activities that the corporation conducts [in the forum] and 
determine[d] whether they are ‘significantly larger’ than in the next-ranking 
State.”61  However, in Daimler, the rule was expanded and general 
jurisdiction now requires “an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in their 
entirety, nationwide, and worldwide.”62  This leaves an ambiguous rule for 
litigants where they must evaluate not only the defendant’s contacts with the 
forum state, but compare the contacts with the forum state in some 
unspecified way to the defendant’s contacts elsewhere.63 
More recently, the Second Circuit clarified this rule and reiterated “that a 
corporation may nonetheless be subject to general jurisdiction in a state only 
where its contacts are so ‘continuous and systematic,’ judged against the 
corporation’s national and global activities, that it is ‘essentially at home’ in 
that state.”64  The Court explained that “[a]side from an ‘exceptional 
case,’ . . . a corporation is at home (and thus subject to general jurisdiction, 
                                                                                                                   
 57 Id. (quoting Brief for Respondents 16–17 & nn.7–8). 
 58 Id. The Court cites two cases, Barrow S. S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898) and Tauza 
v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915 (N.Y. 1917) where a corporation’s continuous 
operations in a forum State were enough to allow the exercise of general jurisdiction, but 
dismissed them because they were decided in an “era dominated by Pennoyer’s territorial 
thinking” and “should not attract heavy reliance today.”  Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761, n.18.  
 59 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945)). 
 60 Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92–93 (2010). 
 61 Id. at 93.  
 62 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762, n.20.  
 63 Id. at 770 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 64 Gucci Am. Inc. v. Bank of China, 768 F.3d 122, 135 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Daimler, 
134 S. Ct. at 761–62). 
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2017  2:57 PM 
2016] HOLDING SUPPORTERS OF TERRORISM ACCOUNTABLE 109 
 
consistent with due process) only in a state that is the company’s formal 
place of incorporation or its principal place of business.”65 
Justice Sotomayor criticized the Court’s reasoning in Daimler, remarking 
that the case should have been resolved under a forum non conveniens 
analysis, and concurred only in the judgment.66  In her view, the Daimler 
reasoning created a situation where multinational corporations are “too big 
for general jurisdiction.”67  She also criticized the Court’s examination of 
Daimler AG’s contacts with fora beyond California as being inconsistent 
with general jurisdiction and due process precedent.68  In Perkins, 
Helicopteros, and Goodyear the Court’s analysis to determine the 
appropriateness of the exercise of general jurisdiction included only those 
defendants’ contacts and holdings in the forum states.69  This is consistent 
with the reasoning of International Shoe that where a defendant “invoke[s] 
the benefits and protections of a State . . . the State acquires the authority to 
subject the company to suit in its courts.”70  But, inexplicably, the Court 
followed a path “untethered from this rationale” by analyzing the corporate 
defendant’s contacts in places other than the forum.71  The Court’s new rule 
requires that defendants possess not only “continuous and systematic 
contacts” in the forum, but that “those contacts must also surpass some 
unspecified level when viewed in comparison to the company’s ‘nationwide 
and worldwide’ activities.”72  In Justice Sotomayor’s view of the 
International Shoe rule, the nature of the global economy has evolved to a 
point where a foreign defendant could sufficiently enjoy the benefits of 
multiple states to be considered “essentially at home” in each of them.73  
Such broad jurisdiction is merely an “inevitable consequence” of the 
International Shoe rule being applied in a modern global interconnected 
                                                                                                                   
 65 Id.  The Second Circuit’s examination of general jurisdiction is relevant because the 
District Court of D.C. uses this as their reference for application of general jurisdiction over 
the Palestinian Authority and Palestine Liberation Organization. 
 66 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 764 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
 67 Id. Justice Sotomayor compares this to the recent phenomenon where banks and 
corporations are deemed “too big to fail.” 
 68 Id. at 767–70. 
 69 Id. at 767–68.  In fact, as Justice Sotomayor notes, in Perkins, the Court recognized that the 
corporation’s contacts in the forum state “were not substantial in comparison to its contacts 
elsewhere.”  Id. (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 341 U.S. 437, 438 (1952)). 
 70 Id. at 768.  
 71 Id.  See also Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. 
REV. 721, 742 (1988) (“We should not treat defendants as less amenable to suit merely 
because they carry on more substantial business in other states . . . . [T]he amount of activity 
elsewhere seems virtually irrelevant to . . . the imposition of general jurisdiction over a 
defendant.”).  Interestingly, this article was cited and relied on by the majorities of both 
Daimler and Goodyear. 
 72 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 770 (emphasis added). 
 73 Id. at 771. 
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economy.74  The majority rejected this view and the prospect of an analysis 
based on reasonableness factors on the grounds that it was unpredictable for 
the company and judicially inefficient.75  
III.  CIVIL LITIGATION UNDER THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT OF 1991 
A.  Litigation Under the Alien Torts Statute 
Anti-terrorism litigation is a relatively new brand of cases.  It has been 
used both as a way for families of victims to receive compensation and as a 
way to influence those who commit or support terrorism.  The first cases 
were brought under the Alien Torts Statute (ATS), which provided district 
courts with jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien for a 
tort . . . committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.”76  The first major case attempting to hold the PLO responsible for 
terrorist attacks, Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, did not provide much 
guidance or precedent because each judge on the D.C. Circuit’s panel wrote 
his own separate concurring opinion.77  Judge Edwards refused jurisdiction 
on the grounds that the PLO was not a “recognized member of the 
community of nations”78 and that the lack of consensus in the international 
community on the legitimacy of terrorism indicated that it was not a 
violation of the laws of nations.79  Judge Bork also took issue with the fact 
that there was no international agreement defining terrorism and therefore 
couldn’t be considered a violation of customary international law.80  He 
reasoned that there was no cause of action to sue under international law or 
under the ATS.81  Judge Robb invoked the political question doctrine in his 
concurrence, reasoning that this issue was wholly outside of the court’s 
purview.82  This result left the issue unresolved and ripe for further litigation. 
                                                                                                                   
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 762 n.20.  Such reasonableness factors as those identified in Asahi include “the 
burden on the defendant,” “the interests of the forum State,” “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining 
relief,” “the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of 
controversies,” “the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive 
social policies,” and “the procedural and substantive policies of other nations whose interests are 
affected by the assertion of jurisdiction.”  Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113–15. 
 76 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (LexisNexis through Pub. L. No. 114-327). 
 77 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., 
concurring); id. at 798 (Bork, J., concurring); id. at 823 (Robb, J., concurring).  
 78 Id. at 791 (Edwards, J., concurring). 
 79 Id. at 796. 
 80 Id. at 806–07 (Bork, J., concurring). 
 81 Id. at 799.  In Judge Bork’s view, the ATS was purely jurisdictional and did not create 
any cause of action for the plaintiffs. Id. at 813.  
 82 Id. at 823 (Robb, J., concurring).  
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2017  2:57 PM 
2016] HOLDING SUPPORTERS OF TERRORISM ACCOUNTABLE 111 
 
The next case arose from the tragic killing of wheelchair-bound Leon 
Klinghoffer in the 1985 forcible seizure of the Italian passenger liner Achille 
Lauro.83  This time, the district court found subject matter jurisdiction under 
both admiralty jurisdiction84 and the Death on the High Seas Act.85  The 
court justified its exercise of personal jurisdiction under state law based on 
the PLO’s contacts in New York through its permanent observer to the 
U.N.86  Most importantly, the court rejected the idea that suits against the 
PLO were nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine.87  The court 
reiterated that the doctrine excluded “political questions, not . . . political 
cases.”88  The Second Circuit agreed with the district court on the political 
question issue, but remanded on service of process and personal jurisdiction 
grounds, holding that “only those activities not conducted in furtherance of 
the PLO’s observer status may properly be considered as a basis of 
jurisdiction.”89  
Litigation under the ATS took a significant hit in 2013 with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.90  In what seems 
like a harsh setback to human rights groups,91 the Court held the presumption 
against extraterritoriality applied to the ATS because “nothing in the text of 
the statute suggests that Congress intended causes of action recognized under 
it to have extraterritorial reach.”92  Though this is a significant limiting 
decision on the ATS, there are still avenues for victims of human rights 
abuses abroad to pursue.93 
The PA has also been sued under the Torture Victims Protection Act 
(TVPA),94 which provides a cause of action for acts of torture and 
                                                                                                                   
 83 Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 84 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (LexisNexis through Pub. L. No. 114-327). 
 85 Klinghoffer, 739 F. Supp. at 858–59.  See Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. 
§§ 30301–30308 (LexisNexis through Pub. L. No. 114-327). 
 86 Klinghoffer, 739 F. Supp. at 862–63.  
 87 Id. at 859–60. 
 88 Id. at 860 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).  
 89 Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 51–53 (2d Cir. 1991).  
 90 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).  
 91 See Gwynne L. Skinner, Beyond Kiobel: Providing Access to Judicial Remedies for 
Violations of International Human Rights Norms by Transnational Business is a New (Post-
Kiobel) World, 46 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 158 (2014) (discussing the consequences of 
Kiobel on human rights litigation and the ability of victims to seek remedies from 
transnational corporations). 
 92 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665.  See also Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 
247, 255 (2010) (“When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it 
has none.”).  
 93 See Roxanna Altholz, Chronicle of a Death Foretold: The Future of U.S. Human Right 
Litigation Post-Kiobel, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1495 (2014) (outlining the difficulties of post-Kiobel 
litigation and the avenues still available to victims).  
 94 Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012). 
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extrajudicial killing.95  However, the Supreme Court rejected the application 
of the TVPA to the PA on the grounds that the statute only applied to acts 
committed by individuals, not organizations.96  
B.  The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1991 
In the wake of Tel-Oren and Klinghoffer, Congress passed the Anti-
Terrorism Act of 1991 (ATA),97 which creates a private cause of action for 
any U.S. national injured by an act of terrorism and provides that successful 
plaintiffs “shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost 
of the suit, including attorney’s fees.”98  This act was passed, in part, because 
many members of Congress felt that jurisdiction should be broadened so it 
was not only in fortuitous cases like Klinghoffer that such suits could go 
forward.99 
Following a deadly attack by a gunman at a bat mitzvah in Israel, the 
family of an American citizen killed in the attack sued the PA and PLO 
under the ATA.100  The defendants moved for dismissal on the grounds that 
they enjoyed sovereign immunity and that the claims were nonjusticiable 
under the political question doctrine.101  The court rejected the defendants’ 
sovereign immunity argument because they failed to sufficiently establish 
that Palestine is a state under international law and because the United States 
had not recognized Palestine, it was not “entitled in our courts to be accorded 
all the privileges and immunities of sovereign states. . . .”102  The court also 
rejected the nonjusticiability argument by following the same reasoning from 
Klinghoffer, reasoning that a terrorist attack was just like any common law 
tort claim103 and nonjusticiability only applied to “political questions” not 
“political cases.”104  After losing on the motion to dismiss, the PA and PLO 
                                                                                                                   
 95 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2(a)(1), 106 Stat. 73 (1992). 
 96 Mohamad, 132 S. Ct. at 1709 (“[T]he TVPA’s text evinces a clear intent not to subject 
non-sovereign organizations to liability.”).  
 97 137 CONG. REC. E1583 (May 2, 1991).  
 98 18 U.S.C.A. § 2333(a) (LexisNexis through Pub. L. No. 114-327).  
 99 Adam N. Schupack, Note, The Arab-Israeli Conflict and Civil Litigation Against 
Terrorism, 60 DUKE L.J. 207, 213 (2010) (citing 137 Cong. Rec. S8143 (1991) (statement of 
Sen. Grassley) (“The ATA removes the jurisdictional hurdles in the courts confronting victims 
and it empowers victims with all the weapons available in civil litigation . . . .”)). 
 100 Knox v. PLO (Knox I), 306 F. Supp. 2d 424, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 101 Id. at 427. 
 102 Id. at 429–30. 
 103 Id. at 449 (citing Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 49–50). 
 104 Id. (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217). 
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stopped litigating this case and the court entered a default judgment of over 
$192 million.105  
Knox I was one of many cases with similar outcomes against the PA and 
PLO.106  In response, Mahmoud Abbas, the newly elected president of the 
PA, announced a new intention to litigate suits like Knox I.107  In response to 
this change, the court granted the PA’s motion for relief and vacated the 
judgment.108  Following this, the PA quietly settled the suit with the family 
of the victim for an undisclosed amount.109  
These early cases under the ATA show some overall trends.  The political 
question doctrine and the nonjusticiability of claims for terrorist attacks are 
no longer issues; the court now treats these claims as ordinary tort claims.  
The courts have also continued to reject the sovereign immunity arguments 
of the PA and PLO on grounds that they fail to meet the international 
standards of statehood and have not been officially recognized by the 
executive branch.  The recent developments in these cases have also shown a 
willingness by the PA and PLO to litigate these claims and allow them to be 
adjudicated on the merits.  Lastly, these cases have proven to be a somewhat 
effective tool against terrorism. Litigation under the ATA can be a lengthy, 
but effective way for families and victims to receive compensation.  
IV.  APPLICATION OF DAIMLER TO UNINCORPORATED, NON-SOVEREIGN 
ENTITIES 
A.  Case Law in the District Court of D.C. 
Before examining the recent cases in the District Court of D.C., it is 
important to explore some earlier decisions in that jurisdiction that might 
explain how and why the court ruled the way it did. 
In 2005, prior to Kiobel and Daimler, the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit heard Mwani v. Bin Laden, where the court 
concluded that specific jurisdiction was proper when defendants 
“purposefully directed” their activities at the United States and the litigation 
                                                                                                                   
 105 Knox v. PLO (Knox II), 248 F.R.D. 420, 423–24 (2008).  Note the size of the judgment 
was due to the allowance of triple damages under 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a).  
 106 See, e.g., Ungar v. PLO, 402 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 2005); Sokolow v. PLO (Sokolow I), 583 
F. Supp. 2d 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 424 F. Supp. 2d 153 
(D.D.C. 2006); Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 422 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 
2006); Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 310 F. Supp. 2d 172 (D.D.C. 2004). 
 107 Knox II, 248 F.R.D. at 424. 
 108 Id. at 433. 
 109 Melissa Apter, PA settles with terror victim, JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY (Feb. 18, 
2010, 12:07 AM), http://www.jta.org/2010/02/18/news-opinion/united-states/pa-settles-with-
terror-victim.  
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resulted from injuries to the plaintiffs “as a result of those actions.”110  In this 
case, the plaintiffs were victims, families of victims, and businesses harmed 
in the 1998 terrorist attack at the American embassy in Nairobi.111  The 
circuit court held that the district court could exercise specific jurisdiction 
because defendants Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda had “ ‘purposefully 
directed their activities at residents’ of the United States.”112  This was 
because the defendants had “engaged in unabashedly malignant actions 
directed at [and] felt in this forum.”113  The plaintiffs’ injuries also clearly 
arose from the defendant’s activities and therefore bin Laden and al Qaeda 
had “fair warning that their activities would subject them to the jurisdiction 
of the United States.”114  The court, however, did affirm the dismissal of 
claims against defendant Afghanistan because the claims against the nation 
did not fall within the exceptions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act.115 
Following this decision, another important memorandum opinion from 
the District of D.C. authorized the exercise of personal jurisdiction over 
Hamas for terrorist attacks in Tel Aviv.116  Like in Mwani, the court found 
the defendant, Hamas, subject to specific jurisdiction and sought to use the 
long-arm provision of Rule 4(k)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.117  Rule 4(k)(2) “permits a federal court to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant (1) for a claim arising under federal law, (2) 
where a summons has been served, (3) if the defendant is not subject to the 
jurisdiction of any single state court, (4) provided that the exercise of federal 
jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution (and laws) of the United 
                                                                                                                   
 110 Mwani v. Bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  It is important to point out that the 
plaintiffs used the Alien Torts Statute to provide subject matter jurisdiction and a cause of 
action so the court might have come to a different conclusion in a post-Kiobel analysis. Id. at 
5, 9–10.  
 111 Id. See also FBI Executive Summary, Bombings of the Embassies of the United States of 
America at Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, FRONTLINE (Nov. 18, 1998), http:// 
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/bombings/summary.html. 
 112 Mwani, 417 F.3d at 13 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472). 
 113 Id. (quoting GTE New Media Servs. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 
2000)).  
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 17. 
 116 Sisso v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 448 F. Supp. 2d 76, 90 (D.D.C. 2006).  The court also 
approved the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Iran under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (FSIA), which only requires proper service and an exception to sovereign 
immunity. Id. at 81–82.  The plaintiffs properly served the defendant under Section 1608 of 
FSIA and the court found Iran’s alleged actions fell under Section 1605(a)(7) of FSIA, which 
provides that there is no sovereign immunity for nations that support or cause terrorist 
activities. Id. at 84–86. 
 117 Id. at 87. 
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States.”118  In determining what proper service required, the court recognized 
that Hamas constituted an “unincorporated association,” which it defined as 
“a body of persons acting together and using certain methods for prosecuting 
a special purpose or common enterprise.”119  As such, service is determined 
in the same way as service for a corporation or association.120  Following 
Rule 4(f)(1), plaintiffs served the summons and complaint on the Director of 
the Courts of the State of Israel, which manages service of process over the 
West Bank.121  
Continuing its analysis of jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2), the court 
followed the rule set in Mwani that “whenever a plaintiff invokes Rule 
4(k)(2) as a basis for personal jurisdiction in federal court, the burden is on 
the defendant to identify some state court where it could be sued.”122  
Because Hamas did not appear in the court to suggest another appropriate 
jurisdiction, the court presumed that Hamas was “not subject to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction of any state.”123  
Most relevant to this Note, the court held that the exercise of specific 
personal jurisdiction was appropriate under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.124  The court followed the standard set 
forth in Mwani that “when a court attempts to assert specific jurisdiction 
without an out-of-state defendant’s consent, [the] ‘fair warning’ requirement 
is satisfied if the defendant has ‘purposefully directed’ his activities at 
residents of the forum, and the litigation results from alleged injuries that 
‘arise out of or relate to’ those activities.”125  There was no question that, if 
proven, the plaintiff’s allegations against Hamas demonstrated that the 
defendant’s actions were “calculated to cause injury to U.S. citizens (among 
others) and, predictably, did just that.”126  The court distinguished this case 
from previous cases like Mwani but still upheld personal jurisdiction, stating: 
Although most such cases have involved terrorist acts that 
targeted U.S. persons or interests with a directness not evident 
in the facts alleged here (e.g., assaults on American servicemen 
or embassies), it is nonetheless entirely foreseeable that an 
indiscriminate attack on civilians in a crowded metropolitan 
                                                                                                                   
 118 Id. at 87–88 (quoting Mwani, 417 F.3d at 10). 
 119 Id. at 88 (quoting Estates of Ungar v. Palestinian Auth., 304 F. Supp. 2d 232, 258 (D.R.I. 
2004)). 
 120 Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 4(h)). 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at 89 (citing Mwani, 417 F.3d at 11).  
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at 90. 
 125 Id. at 89 (quoting Mwani, 417 F.3d at 11–12). 
 126 Id. 
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center such as Tel Aviv will cause injury to persons who reside 
in distant locales – including tourists and other visitors to the 
city, as well as relatives of individuals who live in the area.  
The ripples of harm that flow from such barbarous acts rarely 
stop at the banks of the Mediterranean Sea or the Jordan River, 
and those who engage in this kind of terrorism should hardly be 
surprised to find that they are called to account for it in the 
courts of the United States – or, for that matter, in any tribunal 
recognized by civilized peoples.127 
The court further recognized that other federal courts had concluded that 
Hamas had sufficient contacts, financial and operational, with the United 
States to allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction for claims pursued by 
victims of terrorist attacks and their families.128  In sum, there was no 
constitutional issue with the court’s exercise of specific personal jurisdiction 
over Hamas for plaintiffs’ claims under the ATA.129  
In 2014, only months before its decision regarding the PA and PLO in 
Livnat, the court granted a motion to dismiss claims made against the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) because the court concluded it 
lacked personal jurisdiction.130  First, the court evaluated the TRNC’s 
contacts in the District of Columbia under the Daimler analysis which 
requires a defendant be “essentially at home” in the forum.131  The court 
found that plaintiff’s allegations fell “woefully short” of showing the TRNC 
to be “at home” and instead demonstrated the TRNC’s rightful home was in 
northern Cyprus, not in the United States.132  In particular, the court based its 
analysis on the plaintiff’s assertions that the TRNC: 
1.  Hir[es] employees from abroad and send[s] them as 
representative or staff to the District of Columbia, leas[es] 
office, hir[es] and pay[s] lawyers, [uses] letterhead, [an] 
interactive website, phone, email, facsimiles, maps, and a DC 
postal address, writ[es] letters to newspapers, speak[s] at 
                                                                                                                   
 127 Id. at 90. 
 128 Id. (citing Estates of Ungar, 304 F. Supp. 2d at 256 (“Hamas has consistently conducted 
extensive fundraising, operational planning, recruitment, propaganda, public relations, money 
laundering, investment, and communication activities in at least six states . . . and 
Washington, D.C. over at least the past 12 years.”)). 
 129 Id.  
 130 Toumazou v. Turkish Republic of N. Cyprus, 71 F. Supp. 3d 7, 13 (D.D.C. 2014).  The 
plaintiffs also sued HSBC for their alleged involvement in aiding the TRNC, but the courts 
granting of HSBC’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is not relevant to this issue. 
 131 Id. at 14–15 (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 758 n.11 (2014)). 
 132 Id. at 15. 
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universities, [and] ha[s] offices [with] other TRNC 
representative[s] who are business owners; 
2.  Employs a known lobbyist and representative of the 
Turkish Cypriot Community and not the . . . TRNC, who holds 
himself out as an ambassador in Washington DC to at least 
Turkey; 
3.  Conducts banking transactions with HSBC and its network 
of institution[s] under its name; 
4.  Maintains a website . . .; and 
5.  Operates in the District without a business license and has 
failed to pay D.C. taxes.133 
With contacts that amounted to what most countries would consider part of a 
typical diplomatic mission to the United States, the court held it lacked 
general jurisdiction over the TRNC. 
Second, the court analyzed whether it could exert specific jurisdiction 
under D.C. law134 which requires that the defendant have “ ‘transacted 
business’ in the District of Columbia” and that the “claims ‘arise from’ the 
business transacted.”135  Specifically, the law required “a nexus between a 
foreign corporation’s particular contact with the District of Columbia and the 
claim that the plaintiff asserts.”136  Using the same facts from above, the 
court held that the plaintiffs “failed to provide sufficient factual allegations 
that the TRNC ‘purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within’ the District of Columbia”137 or that the claims pled “[were] 
based on or arise from those activities.”138  
Third, under Rule 4(k)(2), the court lacked the ability to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over the TRNC.139  Under Rule 4(k)(2), a federal court may 
“exercise general or specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant who lacks 
sufficient contacts with any single forum, but has such contacts with the 
United States as a whole.”140  The plaintiffs asserted that the court had 
jurisdiction under this rule because (1) the defendants maintained a 
representative in both New York and on the West Coast, (2) “participated in 
a Small Business Conference in the ‘Southern United States,’ ” and (3) tried 
to “intervene in litigation in Indiana in 1989.”141  The court rejected this 
                                                                                                                   
 133 Id. at 14. 
 134 D.C. CODE § 13-423(a)(1) (2011). 
 135 Toumazou, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 15.  
 136 Id. (citing Alkanani v. Aegis Def. Servs., LLC, 976 F. Supp. 2d 13, 21 (D.D.C. 2014)). 
 137 Id. at 16 (quoting Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475). 
 138 Id. (citing Atlantigas Corp. v. Nisource, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 2d 34, 44 (D.D.C. 2003)). 
 139 Id. at 18. 
 140 Id. at 17 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2)).  
 141 Id. 
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argument because specific jurisdiction was not satisfied as the claims did not 
arise from these activities and general jurisdiction was not satisfied because 
the contacts fell “far short of demonstrating that the TRNC [was] ‘at home’ 
in the United States.”142  
The district court decided that it did not have personal jurisdiction over a 
non-sovereign, non-corporate governmental organization because the 
organization’s contacts were not sufficient to trigger general jurisdiction 
under a Daimler analysis and the claims did not arise from those contacts 
that did exist.  
B.  Current Cases in the District of Columbia 
Early in 2015, the District Court of the District of Columbia resolved 
three cases against the Palestinian Authority.  In each case, the district court 
dismissed the claims against the PA because it was not subject to general 
personal jurisdiction in the United States.143  In all three cases, the court 
examined the issue under the relatively new Daimler framework.144  These 
rulings came just weeks after a contrary ruling in the Southern District of 
New York—the Sokolow II case discussed below—and as all of these cases 
are likely to be appealed, this outcome sets the stage for a potential circuit 
split.145  
The first two cases, Livnat and Safra, both arose from the same events 
and were decided by the district court on the same day.146  On April 24, 
2011, fifteen Jewish worshippers arrived by car at Joseph’s Tomb, a holy site 
near Nablus in the West Bank.147  While inside, PA security forces outside 
began firing their weapons.148  The Jewish worshippers all ran from the 
building and attempted to escape in their vehicles.149  The leader of the 
Palestinian security personnel, Mohammed Saabneh, allegedly told the other 
Palestinians that he was going to shoot at the vehicles and “cause death.”150  
Along with another member of the security force, Salah Hamed, Saabneh 
allegedly opened fire on the vehicles at close range.151  In one vehicle, three 
                                                                                                                   
 142 Id. 
 143 Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d at 22; Safra v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 
3d at 40; Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d at 240. 
 144 Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 25; Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 44; Klieman, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 242. 
 145 Julie Triedman, A Split Over Terror Suits, AM. LAW., Apr. 27, 2015.  See also Julie 
Triedman, Suit Against PLO Rejected on Jurisdictional Grounds, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 9, 2015. 
 146 Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 22; Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 40. 
 147 Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 22; Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 40.  
 148 Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 22; Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 40. 
 149 Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 22; Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 40. 
 150 Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 22; Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 40. 
 151 Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 22; Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 40. 
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people were wounded by the gunfire, including Yitzhak Safra and Natan 
Safra.152  In the other vehicle, Ben-Yosef Livnat was fatally shot in the 
neck.153  The two cases were brought by the Safras and the family of Ben-
Yosef Livnat.154  The plaintiffs in each case alleged that Saabneh and the 
other security force personnel attempted to tamper with the scene by 
replacing shell casings with rocks to make it look like they had been attacked 
with thrown rocks.155  The plaintiffs claimed that the attack was “part of the 
Palestinian Authority’s policy and practice of encouraging acts of terror and 
using terrorism to influence U.S. public opinion and policy.”156  
The district court used the same legal analysis for both cases, so this Note 
will only detail the discussion in Livnat.  The court first examined whether it 
could exercise jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2).157  Because the PA did not 
concede that any other state would have had jurisdiction, the court could use 
4(k)(2) to confer jurisdiction as long as “exercising jurisdiction [was] 
consistent with the United States Constitution and laws.”158  To determine 
this, the court answered three questions.159  First, does due process apply to 
the PA as an entity?160  Second, can the court exercise general jurisdiction 
over the PA?161  Third, is there specific jurisdiction over the PA for the 
claims in these actions?162  
First, the court concluded that due process is applicable to the Palestinian 
Authority.163  Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya held that 
foreign states did not possess due process rights because they were “juridical 
equals” to the United States.164  However, that rule does not apply to the PA 
because, “[l]ike foreign state-owned corporations, but unlike sovereign 
                                                                                                                   
 152 Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 40. 
 153 Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 22. 
 154 Id.; Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 41. 
 155 Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 22; Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 41.  There are some questions about 
this set of facts though.  Some newspapers reported that the Jewish worshippers were fired upon 
for attempting to break through a Palestinian security forces checkpoint.  See Chaim Levinson & 
Anshel Pfeffer, Israelis Shot in West Bank Tried to Break Through Palestinian Roadblock, Probe 
Shows, HAARETZ (Apr. 24, 2011), http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israelis-shot-in-west-ban 
k-tried-to-break-through-palestinian-roadblock-probe-shows-1.357885; Edmund Sanders, One 
Israeli killed, three hurt in West Bank Shooting, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2011), http://articles.latim 
es.com/2011/apr/25/world/la-fg-west-bank-shooting-20110425. 
 156 Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 22; Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 41. 
 157 Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 24–25. 
 158 Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2)). 
 159 Id. at 25–26. 
 160 Id. at 25. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. at 26. 
 164 Id. (citing Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 96–97 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002)). 
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nations, the Palestinian Authority, a non-sovereign government, is not a 
juridical equal of the United States.”165  The plaintiffs tried to claim that the 
PA was like a municipality, which they argued had no due process rights, but 
the court dismissed this argument, stating “in fact, ‘[t]he circuits are split as 
to whether a state’s political subdivisions are afforded due process under the 
Fifth Amendment,’ and the D.C. Circuit has not yet spoken on the issue.”166  
The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the PA has no due 
process rights because of old cases that held the PLO had no rights because it 
was “outside the constitutional structure of the United States.”167  More 
recent case law holds that “foreign state-owned corporations have due 
process rights even though they are outside of the constitutional structure of 
the U.S.”168  The court also distinguished the fact that the PA had not existed 
when the cases were decided and that the factors to consider in each case 
would be different.169 
Next, the court held that there was no general jurisdiction over the PA 
under a Daimler analysis.170  The plaintiffs argued that the Daimler 
framework did not apply to the PA for two reasons: first, Daimler only 
applied to corporations and not to entities like the PA;171 and second, a 
Daimler analysis is appropriate to evaluate contacts with a single state under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, not under the Fifth Amendment when looking at 
contacts with the United States as a whole.172  The court rejected the first 
argument, stating that the Supreme Court in Daimler made no indication that 
the rule would be limited in application only to corporate defendants.173  The 
court rejected the idea that the Supreme Court intended for corporate 
defendants to have greater protections under the law than non-sovereign 
governments like the PA.174  The court also disagreed that there was “a more 
flexible jurisdictional inquiry” under the Fifth Amendment Due Process 
                                                                                                                   
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. (quoting South Dakota v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 665 F.3d 986, 991 (8th Cir. 2012)). 
 167 Id. at 27.  See also Palestine Info. Office v. Shultz, 674 F. Supp. 910 (D.D.C. 1987) 
(finding that the defendant PLO had no due process rights because the word “person” did not 
apply to the states or a foreign state), aff’d, 853 F.2d 932, 272 U.S. App. D.C. 1 (D.C. Cir. 
1988); Mendelsohn v. Meese, 695 F. Supp. 1474, 1480–81 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that a 
foreign state that “lies outside the structure of the Union” does not abide by United States law 
or accept the constitutional plan). 
 168 Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 27 (citing GSS Group Ltd v. Nat’l Port Auth., 680 F.3d 805 
(D.C. Cir. 2012)). 
 169 Id.  
 170 Id. at 30. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. at 28. 
 174 Id. 
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clause than under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.175  
Ultimately, the court decided that the Daimler analysis was the appropriate 
framework for analyzing whether the PA was subject to general jurisdiction 
in U.S. federal court and proceeded to analyze whether the PA was 
“essentially at home in the United States.”176  
As the Palestinian Authority does not have a place of incorporation or a 
principal place of business, the court asked where the PA was fairly regarded 
as “at home.”177  After considering the fact that the PA governs part of the 
West Bank in Israel, the court concluded that “[i]t is common sense that the 
single ascertainable place where a government such as the Palestinian 
Authority should be amenable to suit for all purposes is the place where it 
governs.”178  In this case, that place is in the West Bank, not in the District of 
Columbia or the United States.179  The court rejected the plaintiffs’ 
arguments that the PA was active enough in the United States to be 
considered at home there.180  
In rejecting specific jurisdiction over the PA, the court looked at whether 
the defendant’s relationship with the forum arose from “contacts that the 
defendant himself create[d] with the forum.”181  In particular, it is important 
that the defendant’s contacts be with the forum itself, not with the people 
who live there.182  The court then rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the 
PA purposefully directed its actions at the United States because the links 
between the plaintiffs and the United States were too attenuated.183  
Importantly, the plaintiffs failed to claim that the impact of these attacks was 
anything but “random or fortuitous.”184  The court also distinguished these 
facts from those in Calder v. Jones, which applied the effects test and 
                                                                                                                   
 175 Id. (citing Abelesz v. OTP Bank, 692 F.3d 638, 656 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The issue under the 
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is whether the contacts are so 
continuous and systematic as to render defendants essentially at home in the forum.”)).  See 
also S.E.C. v. Straub, 921 F. Supp. 2d 244, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[B]ecause the language of 
the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause is identical to that of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
due process clause, the same general principles guide the minimum contacts analysis.”). 
 176 Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 29. 
 177 Id. (quoting Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761). 
 178 Id. at 30. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. Plaintiffs’ attributed activities conducted by the PLO, such as “fundraisers, 
community outreach, cultural events, and lectures, as well as certain governmental services, 
particularly consular services” to the PA, but the court denied that those activities would be 
“so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in” the U.S.  Id. (quoting 
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751). 
 181 Id. at 32 (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014)). 
 182 Id. (quoting Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122).  
 183 Id. at 32–33.  
 184 Id.  The court also quoted to Walden where it reinforced that it is “insufficient to rely on 
a defendant’s random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts.”  See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123. 
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allowed specific jurisdiction where the effects in a libel claim were felt in 
that forum.185  In Calder, the focal point of the case and the harms were felt 
in California, while in this case, “[t]he focal point of the harm was surely in 
the West Bank.”186  
The court also distinguished the unintentional effects in the United States 
in this case from those in Mwani, where the actions of the defendants were 
directly aimed at the United States and American personnel.187  Similarly, the 
court rejected that the decision in Sisso applied to this case either.188  There, 
the terrorist attack was a bombing in busy downtown Tel-Aviv and the court 
held that it was reasonably foreseeable that such an attack in a crowded 
metropolitan area could cause injury to people from other forums around the 
world.189  In this case, the actions of a few Palestinian security force 
members at a remote Jewish religious site do not support the same 
conclusion of foreseeability.190  Moreover, the plaintiffs had relied on cases 
decided prior to Walden v. Fiore, where the Supreme Court narrowed the test 
for specific jurisdiction.191  Ultimately, the court decided that the contacts 
with the United States were “simply too attenuated to pass Constitutional 
muster.”192  
Less than one month after the District Court of D.C. decisions in Safra 
and Livnat, the court again tackled this issue in Estate of Klieman v. 
Palestinian Authority.193 Again, the court found that under the Daimler 
paradigm, it could not exercise general or specific jurisdiction over the 
PA.194  In a 2002 attack on a public bus in the West Bank, American teacher 
Esther Klieman was shot and killed by armed terrorists.195  Klieman’s family 
sued the PA and PLO and other defendants in litigation that has lasted over a 
decade.196  After previously denying the defendants’ motions to dismiss, the 
court granted motions for reconsideration after the Daimler decision.197  
For similar reasons to those in Livnat and Safra, the court concluded that 
it could not exercise general jurisdiction over the PA and PLO.198  The 
                                                                                                                   
 185 Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 33 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1983)). 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. at 34–35. 
 189 Id. at 35 (citing Sisso, 448 F. Supp. 2d at 90).  
 190 Id. 
 191 Id.  
 192 Id. at 35–36. 
 193 Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 257 (D.D.C. 2015).  Livnat and 
Safra were both decided on February 11, 2015, while Klieman was decided on March 3, 2015.  
 194 Id. at 240.  
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. at 240–41.  
 197 Id. at 241–42. 
 198 Id. at 244–45. 
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defendants’ contacts in Washington D.C. were not sufficiently “continuous 
and systematic as to render [the PA and PLO] essentially at home in the 
forum . . . .”199  
The court also concluded that it could not exercise specific jurisdiction 
over defendants, even under a Mwani analysis, which allows for specific 
jurisdiction when defendant’s actions are “purposefully directed” at the 
United States and the injuries suffered arose from those actions.200  The court 
rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the terrorist attack supported by the PA 
and PLO “relate[d] to” a simultaneous publicity campaign aimed at the 
United States with the intention of putting pressure on Israel to withdraw 
from Palestinian areas.201  The court also rejected an argument that it was 
foreseeable that injury to Americans would occur as a result of the conduct in 
Israel as that kind of foreseeability test had been rejected in Walden v. Fiore, 
where the Supreme Court held that conduct directed at plaintiffs who were 
residents of another forum did not justify the exercise of specific 
jurisdiction.202 
After failing to find personal jurisdiction over the PA and PLO, the 
District Court came to the same conclusion and outcome as in Livnat and 
Safra.  
C.  Cases in the Southern District of New York 
The Southern District of New York has taken a different approach than 
the D.C. courts and has provided a forum for plaintiffs to sue the PA and 
PLO since before the Daimler decision.203  
For the past decade, families of the victims of attacks during the Second 
Intifada have been waging a legal war against the PA and PLO in the 
Southern District for compensation.204  The case arose from six shootings 
and bomb attacks between 2002 and 2004 that killed thirty-three people and 
wounded over 450.205  
                                                                                                                   
 199 Id. at 245–46. 
 200 Id. at 246–49. 
 201 Id. at 247. 
 202 Id. at 248. 
 203 See, e.g., Klinghoffer, 739 F. Supp. 854; Knox I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 424; Sokolow I, F. 
Supp. 2d 451.  
 204 Stav Ziv, U.S. Jury Finds Palestinian Organizations Liable in Terrorism Case, 
NEWSWEEK (Feb. 23, 2015, 1:43 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/us-jury-finds-palestinian-
organizations-liable-terrorism-case-308804.  
 205 Id. See also Nate Raymond, Victims of Israel Attacks Seek $350 mln as PLO Trial in N.Y. 
Ends, REUTERS (Feb. 20, 2015, 5:24 AM), http://in.reuters.com/article/2015/02/19/plo-israel-
attacks-trial-idINKBN0LN2FU20150219.  
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After years of litigating, the PLO and PA moved for summary judgment, 
arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction after the recent opinion in 
Daimler.206  Prior to the Daimler decision, the defendants had made similar 
motions to dismiss, arguing that they lacked sufficient contacts with the 
United States.207  The district court “denied those motions and ‘agree[d] with 
every federal court to have considered the issue that the totality of activities 
in the United States by the PLO and the PA justifie[d] the exercise of general 
jurisdiction.’ ”208  The PA and PLO argued, that the law had changed and 
that the Daimler decision served as “an intervening change in the controlling 
law.”209  Under the new Daimler paradigm, the defendants argued they were 
not “at home” for the purposes of general jurisdiction in the United States.210  
The district court rejected the PA and PLO’s argument and denied their 
motions for two reasons.211  First, even after Daimler, the district court had 
jurisdiction under the ATA.212  Second, this action is just “such ‘an 
exceptional case,’ as alluded to in Daimler . . . .”213  
The district court pointed out that the defendants were not foreign 
corporations and thus, the paradigm of determining place of incorporation or 
principal place of business was inappropriate.214  Accordingly, the court 
analyzed the defendants’ “continuous and systematic business and 
commercial contacts within the United States” and deemed them sufficient to 
support general jurisdiction, even under the post-Daimler and post-Gucci 
analysis.215  The defendants failed to sufficiently identify any place other 
than the United States where the PLO or PA had “greater business or 
                                                                                                                   
 206 Sokolow II, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168114, at *4. 
 207 Id. at *5. 
 208 Id. (alterations in original). 
 209 Id. at *6. 
 210 Id. at *6–7.  The defendants specifically cited to the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the 
Daimler “at home” rule, which states: 
[A] corporation may . . . be subject to general jurisdiction in a state only 
where its contacts are so ‘continuous and systematic,’ judged against the 
corporation’s national and global activities, that it is ‘essentially at home’ in 
that state.  Aside from ‘an exceptional case’ . . . a corporation is at home (and 
thus subject to general jurisdiction, consistent with due process) only in a 
state that is the company’s formal place of incorporation or its principal place 
of business. 
Id. at *7 (citing Gucci, 768 F.3d at 135).  
 211 Id. 
 212 Id. 
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. at *8.  The defendants had described themselves by a number of terms, including 
“foreign organizational defendants,” “unincorporated,” “foreign governmental organizations,” 
and “an unrecognized foreign state.”  Id. at *8–9 n.3 (citation omitted).   
 215 Id. at *9. 
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commercial activities” to be considered “at home.”216  The district court 
therefore denied the motions and the case moved ahead to trial.217 
The case went to trial in February of 2015.218  The defense claimed that 
the senior leadership of the defendant organizations were not involved in 
planning the violence.219  The jury disagreed and awarded a verdict of $218.5 
million in damages to the victims’ families.220  Under the ATA, the verdict 
was automatically tripled to an astounding $655.5 million.221  The defendants 
immediately announced their intent to appeal the decision.222 
Shurat HaDin, an Israel-based law office that worked on the case, 
released a statement of gratitude for the American court’s decision, 
particularly the decision that “suicide terrorism was indeed [the PA and 
PLO’s] official policy during the Second Intifada. . . .”223  The statement 
continued, saying:  
We started out more than a decade ago with the intent of 
making the defendants pay for their terrorist crimes against 
innocent civilians and letting them know that there will 
eventually be a price to be paid for sending suicide bombers 
onto our buses and into our cafes.  The defendants have already 
been boasting that they will appeal the decision and we will 
never collect on the judgment.  We will not allow them to make 
a mockery of the US court process, however, and we continue 
to pursue them until it is paid in full.  If the PA and PLO have 
the funds to pay the families of the suicide bombers each 
month, then they have the money to pay these victims of 
Palestinian terrorism.224 
The lawyers for the plaintiffs also mentioned that they were confident they 
would be able to collect the damages from the defendants and if not, they 
                                                                                                                   
 216 Id. at *9–10. 
 217 Id. at *10. 
 218 Alexandra Farone, US court finds Palestine groups liable for Israel attacks, JURIST (Feb. 
24, 2015, 11:35 AM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2015/02/us-court-finds-palestine-groups-liable-
for-2002-2004-israel-attacks.php. 
 219 Ziv, supra note 204.  
 220 Farone, supra note 218. 
 221 Id. See also 18 U.S.C.A. § 2333(a) (LexisNexis through Pub. L. No. 114-327) (“[S]hall 
recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney’s 
fees.”). 
 222 Farone, supra note 218.  This verdict came amid a series of problems for the PA, 
including Israel recently deciding to freeze over $200 million it had collected for the PA. Id. 
 223 Ziv, supra note 204. 
 224 Id. 
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would be able to seize their assets.225  From their point of view, this verdict 
“hits those who send terrorists where it hurts them most: in the wallet.”226  
As the plaintiffs’ lawyers put it, “[m]oney is oxygen for terrorism.”227 
Dr. Mahmoud Khalifa, the Palestinian National Authority’s deputy 
minister of information, responded with the organization’s official response, 
calling the charges “baseless” and reiterating that they would appeal the 
verdict.228  The statement went on to decry the case as one based on political 
bias, stating: 
This case is just the latest attempt by hardline anti-peace 
factions in Israel to use and abuse the U.S. legal system to 
advance their narrow political and ideological agenda: to block 
the two state solution, advance the illegal settlements in our 
land, continue to attack and divert the PLO and PNA’s limited 
resources from needed services and programs for our people, 
and to distract the public from the everyday inequities and 
injustices Palestinians face, and which we try to address 
through a proper legal framework.  The decision is a tragic 
disservice to the millions of Palestinians who have invested in 
the democratic process and the rule of law in order to seek 
justice and redress their grievances, and to the international 
community which has invested so much in financial and 
political capital in a two-state solution in which the PLO and 
PNA are paramount.229 
The litigation is not over, though.  This case will go up to the Second Circuit 
next.  Meanwhile, the cases in the district court of D.C. will also be going up 
on appeal and the D.C. Circuit will consider the same issues.  Primarily, 
these courts will be looking at whether the Daimler analysis applies to the 
PLO and PA as non-corporate foreign entities.  If it does apply, the courts 
will have to decide if the groups are “at home” in the United States.  The 
courts might also find that this constitutes an “exceptional case” and allow 
the exercise of general jurisdiction, even under a Daimler analysis.  With two 
appellate courts considering these issues, the possibility of a circuit split is 
imminent.  If that happens, then the Supreme Court will have the ultimate 
say.  
                                                                                                                   
 225 Weiser, supra note 18.  
 226 Id. 
 227 Id. 
 228 Ziv, supra note 188. 
 229 Id. 
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V.  GENERAL JURISDICTION AND ANTI-TERRORISM LITIGATION MOVING 
FORWARD 
A.  Application of Due Process Rights to Non-Sovereign, Non-Corporate 
Entities 
As these cases come up for appellate review, it will be important for the 
courts to first decide if entities like the PA and PLO even possess due 
process rights.  The District Court of D.C. addressed this after the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals decision in GSS Group Ltd. v. National Port 
Authority, which held that the National Port Authority of Liberia and other 
non-state entities, though state owned, did have due process rights.230  The 
court in Livnat distinguished the circuit court’s decision in Price v. Socialist 
People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, where the court decided that foreign states 
were not privileged with due process rights because they were “juridical 
equals” to the United States.231  The court leaned toward the decision of GSS 
Group and held that the PA was more similar to a foreign state-owned 
corporation than a sovereign nation and that a non-sovereign government 
was not a “juridical equal” to the United States.232 
Further analysis of the decisions in Price and GSS Group seems to 
suggest that the answer is not as clear cut as the District Court made it 
appear.  In Price, the court held that “the word ‘person’ in the context of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment cannot, by any reasonable mode 
of interpretation, be expanded to encompass the States of the Union.”233  The 
Price court reasoned that there was no sense in treating foreign states more 
favorably than the “States of the Union” under the Due Process Clause and it 
would actually be “highly incongruous” and “entirely alien to our 
constitutional system” to grant greater rights to foreign nations than to the 
States.234  The Constitution is not designed to limit foreign states in their 
powers that can be exerted against the United States and the “federal 
government cannot invoke the Constitution, save possibly to declare war, to 
prevent a foreign nation from taking action adverse to the interest of the 
United States or to compel it to take action favorable to the United States.”235  
Therefore, the court decided, the Due Process Clause should not be construed 
                                                                                                                   
 230 Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 19, 26 (D.C.C. 2015) (citing GSS Group Ltd. 
v. National Port Authority, 680 F.3d 805 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). 
 231 Id. (citing Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d at 96–97). 
 232 Id. 
 233 Price, 294 F.3d at 96 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323–24 
(1966)). 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. at 97. 
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as to confer upon foreign states the “rights and protections against the power 
of federal government.”236  
The PA blurs the line as a non-sovereign state.  It is, without dispute, a 
government in its own right, though not recognized by the United States as 
sovereign.237  The facts of these disputes have arisen because of the PA’s 
governance of the West Bank and control of security forces.  Nor does the 
PA dispute that it is a state, as it noted in Sokolow when it described itself as 
a “foreign governmental organization[ ]” of “an unrecognized foreign 
state.”238  In the last few years, the PA has taken steps toward recognized 
sovereign statehood, with a successful bid to become a non-member observer 
at the U.N. and a referendum to change its name to the State of Palestine.239  
It is even possible that, as a non-member observer state, the PA could 
participate in and join international organizations such as the World Bank, 
the International Criminal Court, the World Trade Organization, and the 
World Health Organization.240  Such participation in the international process 
indicates a similarity to Libya in Price, rather than the National Port 
Authority of Liberia, as in GSS Group.  
Of particular importance is the Price court’s observation that affording 
due process rights to foreign states might cause “serious practical 
problems.”241  The court noted, “[f]or example, the power of Congress and 
the President to freeze the assets of foreign nations, or to impose economic 
sanctions on them, could be challenged as deprivations of property without 
due process of law.”242  If the courts were charged with adjudicating these 
types of international disputes, then it could inhibit the other branches of 
government during international crises.243  There could also be complications 
with the separation of powers and the potential for judicial overstep into the 
area of foreign policy. 
This argument is particularly persuasive when it comes to the PA and 
PLO, as the United States is exceptionally involved in the international 
                                                                                                                   
 236 Id. 
 237 Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 30. 
 238 Sokolow II, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168114. 
 239 See Ali Gharib, U.N. Adds New Name: “State of Palestine,” DAILY BEAST (Dec. 20, 2012, 
1:30 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/12/20/u-n-adds-new-name-state-of-palest 
ine.html; Palestinians’ UN upgrade to nonmember observer state: Struggles ahead over possible 
powers, FOXNEWS.COM (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/11/29/palestinia 
ns-un-upgrade-to-nonmember-observer-state-struggles-ahead-over/.  
 240 Palestinians’ UN upgrade, supra note 239. 
 241 Price, 294 F.3d at 99. 
 242 Id. 
 243 Id. See also People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 22 
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (“No one would suppose that a foreign nation had a due process right to 
notice and a hearing before the Executive imposed an embargo on it for the purpose of 
coercing a change in policy.”). 
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affairs of their region.  Aid packages and funding are crucial to the United 
States’ influence and relationship with the PA and PLO.244  There have been 
times when the President or Congress has had to restrict or limit that aid for 
political or practical reasons.245  The result of the PA having due process 
rights would seriously undermine executive and legislative power in 
conducting foreign policy if the PA could litigate every time these issues 
come up.  It is not reasonable that while all nations are denied those rights, 
the PA, because of its particular status as non-sovereign, is entitled to them.  
B.  Examining Personal Jurisdiction Under the Fifth Amendment Instead of 
the Fourteenth Amendment  
Assuming for the sake of argument that the PA and PLO do possess due 
process rights, these cases would fall under the Fifth Amendment rather than 
the Fourteenth Amendment, which is how the courts have been addressing it. 
Daimler and Goodyear set forth guidelines for the limitations on state power 
in exercising personal jurisdiction over defendants under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The “at home” standard is crucial for protecting citizens of one 
state from the exercise of power by another.  However, when claims are 
brought under federal law, the Fifth Amendment controls the outcome.246 
Where the “at home” rule protects citizens from the overreach of the 
states in exercising personal jurisdiction, no such interest rests in the 
limitation of federal authority extraterritorially and the Supreme Court has 
authorized the federal government’s ability to exercise power outside United 
States territory.247  The restrictions on personal jurisdiction under the 
Fourteenth Amendment “are more than a guarantee of immunity from 
inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial 
limitations on the power of the respective States.”248  There are no such 
interests for limitation on the power of the federal government in exercising 
power extraterritorially.  Under a Fifth Amendment analysis, the interests in 
                                                                                                                   
 244 See, e.g., Suzy Khimm, U.S. pledges $212 million in additional aid to Palestine, MSNBC 
(Oct. 12, 2014, 8:47 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/us-pledges-212-million-additional-ai 
d-palestine. 
 245 See, e.g., US suspends aid to Palestinians, BBC NEWS (Apr. 7, 2006, 21:09 GMT), http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4889668.stm; Hilary Leila Krieger, US foreign aid package 
may put conditions on PA funding, JERUSALEM POST (July 27, 2011, 5:56), http://www.jpost. 
com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/US-foreign-aid-package-may-put-conditions-on-PA-funding. 
 246 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 247 See United States v. Bennett, 232 U.S. 299, 306 (holding that the due process clause does 
prevent states from acting outside their own territory, but the Constitution “affords no ground 
for constructing an imaginary constitutional barrier around the exterior confines of the United 
States for the purpose of shutting that government off from the exertion of powers which 
inherently belong to it by virtue of its sovereignty”). 
 248 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958). 
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preventing encroachment of States’ power over others “do not apply with 
equal force.”249  Under a Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause analysis, the 
“at home” standard is replaced by a “general fairness test incorporating 
International Shoe’s requirement that ‘certain minimum contacts’ exist 
between the non-resident defendant and the forum ‘such that maintenance of 
the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.” ’ ”250  This “general fairness test” involves a balancing of interests 
between those of the “individual defendant against the federal interest 
involved in the litigation.”251  In these cases dealing with terrorism targeting, 
even indirectly, American citizens, the federal government’s interests are 
extremely high.252  
Balancing the interests of the United States in civilly prosecuting 
perpetrators of international acts of terrorism against the PA’s and PLO’s 
interests in protecting themselves from litigation in a forum where they 
maintain significant contacts, it becomes clear that the government’s 
interests prevail. 
C.  The Possibility of Exceptional Cases Under Daimler 
Even if the appellate courts find that the Daimler framework applies to 
the PA and PLO, it is not clear that these cases would automatically be 
precluded.  Though the Court seems to rule out the exercise of general 
jurisdiction in any case where the forum state is not the place of 
incorporation or the principal place of business, the majority does leave open 
the possibility of exceptional cases where jurisdiction could still be found.253  
Such an exceptional case would be one in which “[a] corporation’s 
operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal 
place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the 
corporation at home in that State.”254 
For example, one possibility might be a corporation incorporated and 
headquartered in one state that conducts all or most of its business in another 
                                                                                                                   
 249 Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 294 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 250 Id. at 293 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). 
 251 Rep. of Panama v. BCCI Holdings, 119 F.3d 935, 946 (11th Cir. 1997).  See also Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (noting that the Fifth Amendment Due Process inquiry 
balances the interests of the private individual and the federal government). 
 252 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (“Everyone agrees that 
the Government’s interest in combating terrorism is an urgent objective of the highest 
order.”); Wultz v. Bank of China, 910 F. Supp. 2d 548, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“When the U.S. 
interest ‘in fully and fairly adjudicating matters before its courts’ is combined with its interest 
in combating terrorism, the U.S. interest ‘is elevated to nearly its highest point . . . .’ ”). 
 253 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761, n.19.  See also Gucci Am., 768 F.3d at 135. 
 254 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761, n.19 (emphasis added). 
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state.255  Under the Daimler paradigm, general jurisdiction could fall in one 
of two categories.  The extent of the corporation’s business in a state could 
turn that state into the corporation’s principal place of business, or a court 
could find that the corporation’s systematic and continuous contacts in that 
state rendered it essentially at home in the forum.256  
Another situation the courts might consider to be an exceptional case 
would be one in which a foreign national corporation conducts the majority 
of its U.S. business in one state.257  A paradigm that allowed this would 
allow U.S. residents a forum to pursue claims against a foreign national 
corporation but would limit the potential forums where the corporation 
would expect to have to respond to litigation.258 
Another potentially exceptional case would be one where a foreign 
national corporation maintains neither a principal place of business nor a 
place of incorporation in any state but which conducts the majority of its 
business in the United States nonetheless, such as in J. McIntyre Machinery, 
Ltd. v. Nicastro.259  This would prevent a corporation from escaping 
jurisdiction when it does not conduct the majority of its business in a single 
state.260 
A corporation could also be held subject to general jurisdiction in 
circumstances where it maintains an imposing or “uniquely important 
business presence” in a forum.261  For example, this could include a situation 
where a corporation establishes an enormous factory or similar commercial 
endeavor in a particular state which has a large impact on the local economy 
or domestic market.262  This could be especially important where the 
corporation negotiated with the state’s government for tax incentives and 
subsidies.263  As long as litigation would be reasonable under a forum non 
conveniens analysis, it is hard to say that such a corporation with a large 
economic presence in a state does not have fair notice that it would 
potentially be liable to suit in that state.264 
                                                                                                                   
 255 Judy M. Cornett & Michael H. Hoffheimer, Good-Bye Significant Contacts: General 
Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 101, 152 (2015). 
 256 Id. 
 257 Id. 
 258 Id. 
 259 Id. at 152–53.  See also Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2794–95 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting 
that the majority’s opinion allows a foreign national corporation to inappropriately escape 
jurisdiction in the U.S.). 
 260 Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 255, at 152. 
 261 Id. at 153. 
 262 Id. 
 263 Id. 
 264 Id. 
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A last possible situation would be one where a corporation operates and 
maintains a large physical presence in the forum state.265  While a large 
corporation might have extensive sales and contacts in every state, it would 
only have such a physical presence in one or a few states, thus giving the 
corporation fair notice of the possibility of legal liability.266  It could also be 
argued that such corporations must submit to legal obligations of operating in 
the state in the same way that local corporations must.267 
The list above of possible exceptional scenarios is merely illustrative and 
not exhaustive.  Courts have been reluctant to find an exceptional case since 
the Daimler ruling.268  The cases against the PA and the PLO seem like ideal 
cases for the courts to analyze exactly what an exceptional case might look 
like. 
Here, the PA and PLO, though their primary activities might be in the 
West Bank, are extraordinarily active in the United States.  They maintain 
missions and consulates in Washington, D.C. and New York.  They actively 
raise funds and awareness for the Palestinian people through those contacts.  
They negotiate with the United States government for funding and aid 
money.  They actively pursue policy initiatives in the United States to 
influence Israeli policy.  They use money to fund terrorist activities which 
are connected to the activities the organizations pursue in the United States.  
It is clear that the litigation here does not fit squarely within a Daimler 
analysis and that such an exceptional case might fall outside of the 
“essentially at home” standard. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
As these cases in Washington and New York proceed on appeal, the 
courts will have to decide whether to exercise personal jurisdiction over the 
                                                                                                                   
 265 Id. at 154 (suggesting factories, mines, or farms as examples). 
 266 Id.  Though courts have asserted jurisdiction over foreign defendants with sufficient real 
estate holdings in cases like Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 277 N.Y. 474 (1938), 
more recently, when applying the Daimler framework, courts have been reluctant to do so.  E.g., 
In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), No. 875, 2014 WL 5394310, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 
2014) (finding against the exertion of general jurisdiction over defendant based on the operation 
of a refinery in the forum state where defendant also operated facilities elsewhere). 
 267 Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 255, at 155, n.250 (citing Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 
172 U.S. 557, 561 (1899); Asbury Hosp. v. Cass Cnty., 326 U.S. 207, 211 (1945)).   
 268  The Second Circuit has so far found that defendants were not “at home” in a forum when 
they had more extensive contacts outside the state.  E.g., Gucci, 768 F.3d at 135 (holding 
defendant’s contacts in the forum were not so “continuous and systematic” as to be essentially 
“at home” and constitute an exceptional case); Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukoroya Holding 
A.S., 750 F.3d 221, 226 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that even defendant’s substantial business 
contacts did not render it “at home”); In re Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany, 745 F.3d 30, 
40 (2d Cir. 2014) (rejecting general jurisdiction over a N.Y. defendant in Vermont). 
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PA and PLO.  This is a question fraught with legal, political, and social 
implications.  There are biases at play that could affect the outcome in each 
of these jurisdictions.  New York’s history with terrorism and demographic 
make-up might have had a subtle effect on the Southern District’s decision.  
More importantly, the decisions in these cases could impact more than just 
the legal process. 
The Daimler framework does not appropriately address the issues at play 
in these cases.  The PA and PLO are not corporations.  The policy issues 
concerning governments like these are very different from those concerning 
corporations.  The legal analysis is different too.  Allowing non-sovereign 
non-corporate entities like the PA and PLO to possess due process rights 
would have drastic consequences for the international relations of the United 
States.  With the long history of violence and intervention in the Middle East, 
allowing entities such as the PA and PLO due process rights would 
compromise the ability of the United States to act.  
The appellate courts’ decisions could also have far-reaching 
consequences if the courts find jurisdiction under a Fifth Amendment 
analysis rather than a Fourteenth Amendment analysis.  The Goodyear and 
Daimler cases set forth a framework for examining state law claims.  These 
cases in New York and Washington were brought under the ATA, a federal 
statute, so at issue is not whether the States have jurisdiction over activities 
that take place outside their territory, but whether the federal courts do.  
Under a balancing test, comparing the interests of the individual to those of 
the government, it becomes clear that the interest in pursuing groups that 
support terrorism outweigh those of the PA and PLO in avoiding such suits.  
Lastly, the courts could clarify the decision in Daimler by expanding on 
the idea of exceptional circumstances.  The PA and PLO do present a 
different circumstance than the one normally approached under a Daimler 
analysis.  They are not corporations, but they are not sovereign nations.  
Their contacts in the United States and their reliance on those contacts are 
extensive.  The interactions between the PA or the PLO and the federal 
government are critical to United States’ interests in the Middle East and to 
the interests of Palestinians.  Such exceptional connections place the PA and 
PLO outside the traditional Daimler context where the defendant must be 
“essentially at home.” 
To hold the supporters of terrorism accountable for these kinds of attacks, 
it is necessary for the American people to have legal recourse.  Hitting 
terrorism where it hurts the most, in its wallet, is the most effective way for 
families and victims to find closure and compensation.  Denying general 
jurisdiction over the PA and PLO under Daimler is contrary to the purpose of 
the decision and counter to the interests of the people and government of the 
United States.  
